Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga
Appeal from the Lakewood Municipal Court Case No. 2014 TRC
APPELLANT Carl A. Collins, pro se
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kevin M. Butler Lakewood Law Director
By: Pamela L. Roessner Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
BEFORE: Laster Mays, J., E.T. Gallagher, P.J., and Boyle, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
LASTER MAYS, J.
On January 9, 2015, defendant-appellant Carl A. Collins
("Collins") entered a no contest plea in the
Lakewood Municipal Court to operating a vehicle under the
influence ("OVI") (Lakewood Codified Ordinance
333.01). In exchange for the no contest plea, the city of
Lakewood ("city") amended the OVI charge under R.C.
4519.11 to the local ordinance, and dismissed the remaining
charges of OVI refusal, OVI driving under suspension,
improper lane usage, and seat belt violation. Collins's
sentence included fines, court costs, community control
supervision with conditions, and a driver's license
Prior to Collins's plea, the trial court denied a motion
to suppress the evidence of his arrest finding there was
probable cause and that the officer properly advised Collins
of the effect of his refusal to take the chemical test.
Collins filed a second motion to suppress with arguments that
mirrored the first motion. The trial court did not address
the duplicate motion.
Collins appealed the trial court's denial of his motion
to suppress in Lakewood v. Collins, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 102953, 2015-Ohio-4389 ("Collins I
"). Collins posed three assignments of error in
Collins I: (1) lack of probable cause; (2) trial
court's denial of the second motion to suppress; and (3)
the city's refusal to release his impounded vehicle. This
court affirmed the trial court's determination, finding
no merit to Collins's claims, and observed that the entry
of Collins's no contest plea rendered the pending,
redundant second suppression motion moot. Collins I
at ¶ 12, citing State v. Bogan, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 84468, 2005-Ohio-3412.
On October 28, 2015, upon remand to the trial court's
jurisdiction, Collins was ordered to appear for a payment
hearing and to address the community control conditions with
the probation department. On November 6, 2015, the trial
court issued an entry providing that the vehicle could be
released to a licensed driver after towing and storage costs
were paid. On January 31, 2016, the trial court denied
Collins's motion to dismiss and vacate the conviction due
to a violation of Collins's speedy trial rights.
Collins's current appeal asks the court to revisit the:
(1) motion to suppress; (2) lack of probable cause; and (3)
release of his vehicle from impound. He has added a fourth
assigned error in the instant case challenging the trial
court's denial of his speedy trial rights.
We find that Collins's first three errors are barred by
the doctrine of res judicata.
Under the doctrine [of res judicata], "a final judgment
of conviction bars the convicted defendant from raising and
litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that
judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that
was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the
trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction or on an
appeal from that judgment."
State v. Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95564,
2011-Ohio-3059, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Perry,
10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967).
As to the remaining assigned error, the trial court stated
that Collins waived his right to a speedy trial and the
waiver was supported by the record. After a review of the
record, we find that Collins's failure to raise the
speedy trial issue in Collins I bars his claim.
"'Res judicata extends to bar not only claims which
actually were litigated, but every question which might
properly have been litigated.'" State v.
Shearer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103848, 2016-Ohi ...