United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Y. Pearson United States District Judge
se Plaintiff Christopher Sanders filed the
above-captioned action against the United States and the
Youngstown Jail Medical Department. The Complaint (ECF
No. 1)does not contain any factual allegations.
Plaintiff asks the Court to allow him to conduct an
is now a federal inmate at Federal Correctional Institution,
McDowell (“FCI McDowell”) in West Virginia. The
body of his Complaint states in its entirety, “I was in
the jail in 2009 after I was sentence [sic] ¶ 240
months.” ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 3.
Plaintiff's prayer for relief states:
To allow me or show me how to start a full investigation on
the jail. Medical team unit officer's [sic] and the
cellmates I had. And the food and drinks in commissary
(things) that are being send [sic] to the federal institution
in holdovers I been to since 2009 when I left the jail in
Youngstown Ohio or is it Dayton Ohio 45429 in the courthouse
in Ohio when I get home. The jail on hold over maybe a
federal correction [sic] institution I am unsure what I am
looking to no [sic] is why the food drinks and other things
coming from Ohio with drugs in it. And a case number civil to
start my investigation.
Id. at PageID #: 4.
Standard for Dismissal
pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the
district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted or if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d
1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An
action has no arguable basis in law when a defendant is
immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a
legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the
allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the
irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). See also Lawler, 898
F.2d at 1199.
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the court must construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all
factual allegations as true, and determine whether the
complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The
plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for relief
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id. at 555. Although a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, its
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true.”
Id. (citation omitted). The court is “not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009), further explains the “plausibility”
requirement, stating that “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. Furthermore, “[t]he plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,
' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This determination is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679.
Law and Analysis
Complaint (ECF No. 1) fails to meet the basic pleading
requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because the Complaint does not contain any factual
allegations or legal claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Principles
requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not
without limits. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
Cir. 1989); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either
direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal
notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer
Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). It
must give defendants fair notice of what a plaintiff's
claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. Bassett
v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d
426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). District courts are not required to
conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to
construct full blown claims from sentence fragments.
Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would require
the courts to “explore exhaustively all potential
claims of a pro se Plaintiff, . . . [and] . . . transform the
district court from its legitimate advisory role to the
improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest
arguments and most successful strategies for a party.”
Id. Here, even liberally construed, the Complaint
does not sufficiently state the federal constitutional claim
or claims upon which Plaintiff intends to base his action.
this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e).
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),
that an appeal from ...