FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF
SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. 2003-01-0003
D. ROBINSON, pro se, for Appellant.
BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
A. SCHAFER, PRESIDING JUDGE.
Defendant-Appellant, Glenn D. Robinson, appeals the judgment
of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
In April 2003, a jury convicted Robinson of two counts of
aggravated murder, one count of murder, one count of
aggravated robbery, one count of having weapons while under a
disability, and one count of carrying concealed weapons. The
jury also found Robinson guilty of the firearm specifications
that accompanied the aggravated murder, murder, aggravated
robbery, and having weapons while under disability counts.
Robinson also pleaded guilty to one count of felonious
assault. The trial court sentenced Robinson to life
imprisonment with parole eligibility after 38 years. On
appeal, this Court determined Robinson's guilty plea was
defective, but affirmed his other convictions and sentences.
See State v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21583,
2004-Ohio-963, ¶ 26, 38. On remand, Robinson re-entered
his guilty plea to the felonious assault count. He did not
appeal his conviction or sentence for that offense.
In October 2010, the trial court resentenced Robinson after
determining that its initial sentence was void for failing to
notify Robinson of post-release control. The trial court did
not resentence Robinson on the felonious assault charge since
he had already fully served his sentence on that count. The
trial court imposed the same prison sentence with respect to
his other convictions and noted that he was subject to a
mandatory five-year term of post-release control upon his
release from prison. On appeal, this Court partially vacated
the October 2010 sentencing entry after determining that the
trial court exceeded its authority by conducting a de novo
sentencing hearing and reissuing a sentence to Robinson.
See State v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25795,
2011-Ohio-6065, ¶ 12, 13. However, this Court affirmed
the trial court's imposition of a mandatory five-year
period of post-release control. Id.
Robinson has since filed a number of post-judgment motions.
Relevant to this appeal, in November 2016, Robinson filed a
"motion to vacate void sentence, and for
resentencing." Within this motion, Robinson cited to the
Supreme Court of Ohio's holding in State v.
Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403');">148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, in arguing
that the trial court erred by imposing separate, albeit
concurrent, sentences on both of his aggravated murder
convictions, as well as his conviction for murder (counts
one, two, and three of the indictment, respectively) after
initially determining that those counts were subject to
merger. The State filed a memorandum in opposition to
Robinson's motion wherein it agreed that Robinson's
sentences on counts two and three (aggravated murder and
murder, respectively) should be vacated, but requested and
elected that Robinson remain sentenced on count one
(aggravated murder). On December 21, 2016, the trial court
issued an entry vacating Robinson's sentences on counts
two and three and resentencing him on count one to life in
prison with parole eligibility after 20 years, which was the
same sentence that the trial court had imposed on count one
during the initial sentencing hearing in 2003.
Robinson filed this timely appeal and presents three
assignments of error for our review. As Robinson's first
and third assignments of error implicate similar issues, we
elect to address them together.
of Error I
When the trial court determines that the sentence is void
pursuant to State v. Williams, [148 Ohio St.3d 403');">148 Ohio St.3d 403,
] 2016-Ohio-7658, and when the State failed to elect which
offense it would pursue at the original sentencing hearing,
the State is required to make the election as to which
offense it wants to pursue at resentencing as is the
prescribed remedy in Williams, ¶ 30, and the
State is not permitted to make the election in a memorandum,
which essentially denies a defendant the opportunity to
contest the election.