United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
DONISE CARTER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Dondrea Lanise Carter, Plaintiff,
LAKE COUNTY, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court upon the Motion (ECF DKT #59)
of Defendants, Marc J. McNaughton, M.D. and Prime Health,
Inc., d/b/a Lake County Family Practice, for Partial Summary
Judgment. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in
part and denied in part.
civil rights and wrongful death action was initially filed on
January 8, 2015 against Lake County, Lake County Sheriff
Daniel A. Dunlap, Nita L. Brickman, Marc J. McNaughton, M.D.
and Prime Health, Inc. An Amended Complaint was filed on July
27, 2016. On August 16, 2016, Defendants Brickman, Lake
County and Dunlap were dismissed with prejudice from the
lawsuit pursuant to Stipulation (ECF DKT ##54 & 55).
decedent, Dondrea Carter, was an inmate at the Lake County
Adult Detention Facility (“LCADF”) in May of 2014
when she complained of chest pain, jaw pain, dizziness,
nausea and anxiety. Nurse Brickman administered an EKG,
provided Dondrea with four packets of Pepto Bismol and
returned Dondrea to her cell. Brickman informed Dr.
McNaughton, the jail physician, when he arrived later, of
Dondrea's medical complaints and that the results of the
EKG were normal. Dr. McNaughton did not see Dondrea nor did
he review the EKG results. A short time afterward, Dondrea
was found unresponsive in her cell. She was transported to
the local ER where she died on May 26, 2014, from a heart
attack due to atherosclerotic coronary artery disease.
Carter, Dondrea's mother and administratrix of her
estate, brings this action for wrongful death, malpractice,
negligence and violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to
provide adequate medical care to Dondrea Carter, an inmate in
move for judgment in their favor arguing that Plaintiff is
unable to satisfy her burden of proof on any of her §
1983 claims. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has no
evidence that McNaughton acted with deliberate indifference
nor that he was a policy-maker for LCADF or for Prime Health.
Additionally, the only policy identified by Plaintiff is the
Inmate Medical Service Policy (ECF DKT #59) which belongs to
the jail and not to Prime Health. Finally, the failure to
train claim fails because McNaughton was not obligated by the
Agreement for Professional Services (ECF DKT #62-2) to
provide training; nor is there evidence that he was involved
in any training of nurses or other jail staff.
opposes with the argument that McNaughton's inaction
amounted to deliberate indifference to Dondrea's serious
medical needs. Plaintiff also insists that McNaughton was
responsible for promulgating medical policy for Prime Health
at the jail. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Prime Health
was responsible for providing necessary, regular and routine
medical services to the LCADF inmates; yet Prime Health
maintained a “policy” of non-existent training
LAW AND ANALYSIS
judgment shall be granted only if “the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The burden is on the moving
party to conclusively show no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986); Lansing Dairy. Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339,
1347 (6th Cir. 1994). The moving party must either point to
“particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” or show
“that the materials cited do not establish the absence
or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). A
court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the
facts and all inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Once the movant
presents evidence to meet its burden, the nonmoving party may
not rest on its pleadings, but must come forward with some
significant probative evidence to support its claim.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Lansing Dairy, 39
F.3d at 1347.
Court does not have the responsibility to search the record
sua sponte for genuine issues of material fact.
Betkerur v. Aultman Hospital Ass 'n., 78 F.3d
1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996); Guarino v. Brookfield
Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404-06 (6th Cir. 1992).
The burden falls upon the nonmoving party to “designate
specific facts or evidence in dispute, ” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); and
if the nonmoving party fails to make the necessary showing on
an element upon which it has the burden of proof, the moving
party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. Whether summary judgment is appropriate depends
upon “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.” Amway Distributors Benefits Ass 'n v.
Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).