United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
CHARLES C. SUPPLEE, Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER [Resolving ECF Nos.
4, 15, 16, 17, 18]
Y. Pearson United States District Judge.
before the Court are pro se Plaintiff's Motion
to Stay the garnishment of his pension (ECF No. 4);
Defendant United States' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
15) and Defendant Ohio Carpenters' Pension
Fund's (“the Fund”) Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 16). Plaintiff then filed Motions to strike
the Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 17, 18.
Interpreting Defendant's Motion to Strike (ECF No.
17) as a response, the Fund filed a Reply. ECF No.
19. Plaintiff subsequently filed a “Memorandum
Contra Defendant Carpenters' Motion to Dismiss, ”
ECF No. 20. The Government has not responded or
replied to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (ECF No.
18), and the time to do so has passed. For the following
reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motions to Stay and
to Strike, and grants Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.
se Plaintiff Charles C. Supplee filed a Complaint
against the United States and Ohio Carpenters' Pension
Fund, arguing that he is not subject to federal income tax;
the United States' Notice of Levy is illegal; and the
United States has collected more money from Plaintiff's
pension than a February 11, 2011 Notice of Levy demands.
Id. at PageID #: 1-2, ¶¶ 1-3, 6-11.
Plaintiff also alleges that the United States violated the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution; Defendants violated
his “God-given rights of privacy, ”; and
Defendants violated his “rights to be secure in his
house, papers and effects.” Id. at PageID #: 1-2,
3, ¶ 1-5, 21, 22. Plaintiff also argues that
Defendants violated RICO and the Hobbs Acts. Id. at
PageID #: 2, ¶¶ 16-20. Plaintiff seeks treble
damages “in excess of $431, 065.65, ” punitive
damages of $1, 000, 000.00, and an order that the United
States release any and all liens and levies against
Plaintiff. Id. at PageID #: 4, ¶¶ 27-30.
Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Stay the levying of taxes
from Plaintiff's pension pending adjudication of this
matter. ECF No. 4.
Standard of Review
pro se pleadings are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972),
“the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro
se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
“Although the standard of review is liberal, it
requires more than bare assertions of legal
conclusions.” Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 438 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citing Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d
716, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1996)). A complaint must “give
the defendants ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'”
Id. (quoting Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726).
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows dismissal for
“lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter” of
claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction may involve either facial attacks or factual
attacks upon a court's jurisdiction. United States v.
Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). “A
facial attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in
the complaint questions merely the sufficiency of the
pleading.” Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007).
When resolving a facial attack, the reviewing court assumes
the allegations within the complaint are true. Id.
When reviewing a factual attack, no presumptive truthfulness
applies, and the court must weigh the conflicting evidence to
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.
Howard v. Whitbeck, 382 F.3d 633, 636 (6th Cir.
2004). A district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
when the allegations of a complaint are “totally
implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v.
Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that jurisdiction
exists. Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121,
1130 (6th Cir. 1996). Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is
a non-waivable, fatal defect. Von Dunser v. Aronoff,
915 F.2d 1071, 1074 (6th Cir. 1990).
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint must
allege enough facts to “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Ass'n of Cleveland Fire
Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548
(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that a pleading contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, “a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds'
of his entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986)). When a claim lacks “plausibility in
th[e] complaint, ” that cause of action fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Twombly,
U.S. 550 at 564. A court may dismiss a claim if the
court finds on the face of the pleading that “there is
an insurmountable bar to relief indicating that the plaintiff
does not have a claim[.]” Ashiegbu v.
Purviance, 76 F.Supp.2d 824, 828 (S.D. Ohio 1998),
aff'd 194 F.3d 1311 (6th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000).
following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motions
to Stay and to Strike and grants Defendants' Motions to
Plaintiff's Motions to Strike
moves to strike Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. ECF
Nos. 17, 18. Plaintiff argues that these
proceedings are “a simulated legal process under color
of law, violating my civil liberties protected by the
Constitution for the [U]nited State of America-Bill of
Rights, for which I demand relief.” ECF Nos.
17, 18. Plaintiff contends that Defendants and
their attorneys have no legal standing in Ohio; the attorneys
representing Defendants are “us[ing] a pseudonym to
conceal their full legal name, which was licensed to practice
law in Ohio, [and] are engaging in official misconduct and
are in contempt of the [S]upreme [C]ourt”; Plaintiff is
“a legal fiction; not a real party in interest to any
real or personal property”; the IRS does not have
authority to tax; and“[t]he ‘National Color'
flying in the courtroom is a symbol of a military court, not
a court created under the ‘United States
Constitution' to adjudicate domestic law.” ECF
Nos. 17, 18.
“Memorandum Contra Defendant Carpenters' Motion to
Dismiss, ” Plaintiff elaborates on his Motions to
Strike, stating that “Plaintiff brought this action in
an Article III court and it appears that Plaintiff's
action has been moved to an Article I court without
Plaintiff's approval.” ECF No. 20 at PageID #:
103. In support, Plaintiff highlights that “[t]he
Caption of [his Motion to Strike] clearly states
‘district court of the United States, ' and the
caption of [the Fund Defendant's Motion to Dismiss]
clearly states “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.”
Id. Plaintiff explains that Title 28 distinguishes
between these titles, and that a “district court of the
United States” is an Article III court, and a
“UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT” is an Article I
misreads Title 28 of the United States Code. Although there
are Article I courts and Article III courts, this case is in,
and has always been in, an Article III court. Both the
“district court of the United States” and
“UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT” refer to this
Article III court. Accordingly, the Court has authority over
the action and all parties, and Plaintiff's arguments ...