United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
VICTORIA G. COLLIN, Petitioner,
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court upon the Motion of Nancy A.
Berryhill, acting commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”), to dismiss
Petitioner's request for Writ of Mandamus for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P.
12(b)(1). (ECF # 9). For the following reasons, the
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Victoria G. Collin filed this petition for Writ of Mandamus
on February 15, 2017, against Respondent (“the
Government”) Nancy A. Berryhill, the acting Commissioner of
Social Security, to compel the Government to: (1) reinstate
Social Security garnishments (“garnishments”) of
James R. Jacobs and (2) issue payments for amounts allegedly
“due and owed” by the Government.
Petitioner's request for (1) reinstatement is no longer
at issue because garnishments resumed in February 2017. On
February 15, 2017, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss
the claim (2) of payments “due and owed.”
obtained a Cuyahoga County Court order to garnish the Social
Security benefits of her ex-husband, Mr. Jacobs, as child
support authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 659. Payment began in
September 2014 and stopped in October 2015. On October 8,
2015, the Government issued notification to Petitioner that
it had received a “stop order” and garnishment
payments would cease. Neither the Petitioner, nor
Petitioner's representative issued a “stop
order” request to cease garnishments by the Government.
In December 2015, Petitioner sent a letter to the Government,
requesting (1) reinstatement and (2) retroactive garnishments
due. The Government resumed payment of garnishments in
January 2017. Petitioner, having exhausted all other avenues
for relief and with no other adequate remedy at law, requests
a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Government to pay those
garnishments uncollected from October 2015 through January
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the
court must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The court need not, however, accept
conclusions of law as true:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief..”
As the Court held in [Bell Atlantic v.]
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955');">127 S.Ct. 1955 [(2007)], the
pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require
“detailed factual allegations, ” but it demands
more than an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation. Id. at 555. A pleading that offers
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of
“further factual enhancement.” Id. at
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the
Petitioner pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a Defendant has acted unlawfully.
Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a Defendant's
liability, it “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.'” Id. at 557.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
to the Sixth Circuit, the standard described in
Twombly and Iqbal “obliges a pleader
to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those
contexts where such amplification is needed to render the
claim plausible.” Weisbarth v. Geauga Park
Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 541 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2nd Cir.
2007)). That is, “Iqbal interpreted
Twombly to require more concrete allegations only in
those instances in which the complaint, on its face, does not
otherwise set forth a plausible claim for relief.”
Weisbarth, 499 F.3d at 542. A complaint should be
dismissed when it fails to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.