United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
OPINION AND ORDER
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO JUDGE
se Plaintiffs Nancy Mott and Terrence Mott filed this
action against Mittel Steel, M.D. Anderson Cancer Centers and
Associates, the United States State Department, Atlas Energy
Group, Atlas Resources, now Targa Resources Corp., Dearing
Compressor Systems and Exterran, now Archrock Compressor
Systems. The body of the Complaint, in its entirety, states:
That the Defendants named above engaged with groups, domestic
and international to: defame, deplete monies, pollute and
distruct [sic] gas reservoirs, distruct [sic] aquifers of the
United States of America.
That the Defendants engaged in a pattern of money-laundering
for foreign and domestic failing ventures.
That the Defendants named above violated RICO statutes.
They ask that this Court remove Mittel Steel's operating
rights and transfer their business and facilities to a
domestic corporation operated by domestic individuals.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Court is required to construe Plaintiffs' pro se
Complaint liberally and to hold it to a less stringent
standard than one drafted by an attorney. Spotts v.
United States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
Pursuant to Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th
Cir. 1999) (per curiam), District Courts are permitted to
conduct a limited screening procedure and to dismiss, sua
sponte, a fee-paid Complaint filed by a non-prisoner if
it appears that the allegations are “totally
implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion.”
Apple, 183 F.3d at 479 (citing Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). Where the
plaintiff's claims are without the “legal
plausibility necessary to invoke federal subject matter
jurisdiction, ” the Court may dismiss the Complaint
upon its own Motion. Id. at 480.
every federal case, the party bringing the suit has the
burden to establish standing to prosecute the action.
“In essence the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the Court decide the merits of
the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Standing is a
“bedrock requirement” of federal jurisdiction.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
471 (1982). If the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the
action, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must
dismiss the case. Langfan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 529 F. App'x 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2013).
Therefore, the Court is obligated to address a party's
lack of standing even if the parties fail to raise the issue
on their own. See Bench Billboard Co. v. City of
Cincinnati, 675 F.3d 974, 983 (6th Cir. 2012).
III standing requires three things of Plaintiffs: (1) that
they suffered an injury-in-fact that is “concrete and
particularized, ” and “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural or hypothetical;'” (2) that they
demonstrate a fair amount of traceability between that injury
they allege they suffered and the “challenged action of
the Defendant;” and (3) there is a likelihood, as
opposed to mere speculation, that “the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 180-81 (2000). See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Langfan v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 529 F. App'x 460,
462 (6th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiffs have not established standing to bring this
action. First, they do not allege that they suffered an
injury-in-fact. They allege the Defendants engaged with
foreign and domestic groups to defame unidentified parties,
deplete monies from unspecified sources, pollute and destruct
gas reservoirs and aquifers in the United States of America.
They also contend the Defendants engaged in a pattern of
money-laundering for foreign and domestic failing ventures.
Assuming the truth of the allegations and construing them in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, they do not plead
facts to suggest that they were personally injured by any of
these alleged actions. In addition, there is no connection
between any of these allegations and any specific Defendant
to say what that Defendant did that Plaintiffs believe met
the description above. Third, Plaintiffs do not demonstrate
that there is a likelihood that the relief they seek -removal
of Mittel Steel's operating rights and transfer of their
business and facilities to a domestic corporation operated by
domestic individuals - would redress any potential injury
from the actions described in the Complaint. Plaintiffs have
not met their burden to demonstrate standing to bring this