Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery
Appeal from Common Pleas Court T.C. NO. 03-CR-4234
D. WOODALL, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
D. KENDRICK, Defendant-Appellant
1} This matter is before the Court on the pro se
Notice of Appeal of Shaun Kendrick, filed May 31, 2016.
Kendrick appeals from the denial of his November 17, 2015 pro
se "Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Crim.R.
32.1 to Correct a Void/Illegal Conviction Based on a
Constitutionally Defective Plea [Evidentiary Hearing
Requested]." We hereby affirm the judgment of the trial
2} Kendricks' direct appeal of his 2005
conviction provides the following initial background of the
The record reflects that Kendrick was charged in three
separate indictments with seventeen counts of rape, three
counts of aggravated robbery, five counts of kidnapping, and
three counts of abduction. The crimes occurred in 1993, 1995,
and 1996-years before Kendrick's indictment. He was
identified as the perpetrator through more recent advances in
Following Kendrick's indictment, he filed a variety of
motions, including a motion to dismiss on
statute-of-limitation grounds, a motion to suppress evidence,
and a motion to sever some of the charges for trial. The
trial court sustained the motion to dismiss with respect to
the abduction charges but overruled it as to the other
charges. The trial court also overruled the motion to
suppress and the motion to sever.
Prior to trial, Kendrick and the State engaged in on-going
plea negotiations. At one point, Kendrick rejected an offer
to plead guilty to five counts of rape with an agreed
sentence of fifty years or, alternatively, to plead no
contest to eight counts of rape with no sentencing
recommendation. The State also rejected Kendrick's
proposal that he plead no contest to five counts of rape.
Kendrick later rejected a second plea offer under which he
would have been required to plead guilty to six counts of
rape with an agreed sentence of fifty years and parole
eligibility after fifteen years.
The matter proceeded to trial on January 24, 2005. Shortly
after the trial began, however, Kendrick agreed to plead
guilty to seven counts of rape, without any sentencing
recommendation, in exchange for the dismissal of all other
charges. The trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11 plea hearing
and accepted the pleas. Thereafter, Kendrick filed a
presentence motion to withdraw the pleas. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court overruled Kendrick's
motion. He subsequently was sentenced to five consecutive
terms of ten to twenty-five years in prison and one
concurrent term of ten to twenty-five years in prison. A
seventh ten-year prison term was ordered to be served
consecutively to the foregoing terms. * * * '
State v. Kendrick, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20965,
2006-Ohio-311, ¶ 3-6 ("Kendrick I ").
3} Kendrick appealed this Court's decision to
the Ohio Supreme Court, which granted a discretionary appeal
and reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court for
resentencing, based upon the Court's decision in
State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856,
845 N.E.2d 470. In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes
Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 411, 2006-Ohio-2394, 848 N.E.2d
809. Kendrick also filed an application to reopen his appeal,
which this Court denied in June 2006.
4} On remand, the trial court "sentenced
Kendrick to ten years on the post-S.B. 2 count, to be served
consecutive to the other six consecutive sentences, "
and Kendrick appealed from this sentence. State v.
Kendrick, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21790, 2007-Ohio-6136,
¶ 4 ("Kendrick II"). Kendrick
asserted in part that "the trial court was only
permitted to impose a minimum, consecutive sentence on
remand." Id., ¶ 15. In affirming the
judgment of the trial court, this Court determined, quoting
Foster, ¶ 7, that "the court had 'full
discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory
range' without being required to make any findings or
give any reasons for imposing more than minimum sentences or
for ordering consecutive sentences." Kendrick
II, ¶ 17.
5} Kendrick filed a "Motion to Dismiss and
Vacate Conviction Pursuant to R.C. 2502.02 & Crim.R.
32(A)(C)" on January 20, 2011, asserting that the trial
court's Resentencing Entry was not a final appealable
order; the trial court overruled the motion, and this Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court. State v.
Kendrick, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24626, 2012-Ohio-504,
¶ 5, 14 ("Kendrick III").
6} "On September 12, 2011, Kendrick filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim. R. 32.1
and Crim. R. 32(C). In a judgment entry issued on February
22, 2012, the trial court overruled Kendrick's motion to
withdraw his plea without conducting a hearing."
State v. Kendrick, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25100,
2012-Ohio-5795, ¶ 9 ("Kendrick IV).
Appointed counsel for Kendrick then filed an appeal pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.
1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Id., ¶ 2.
Kendrick IV provides as follows:
In the instant appeal, Kendrick argues that the trial court
erred when it overruled his most recent motion to withdraw
his guilty plea for the following reasons: 1) he was induced
and coerced into entering a guilty plea; 2) his trial counsel
was ineffective; 3) the trial court abused it[s] discretion
by accepting his "corrupt" plea; and 4) that he was
denied equal protection of the law and due process.
Upon review, we find that the entirety of Kendrick's
claims in his second motion to withdraw his guilty plea
either were or could have been addressed in his direct appeal
or in a motion for post-conviction relief. Claims that could
have been addressed on direct appeal or in a post-conviction
relief motion in support of post-sentence motion to withdraw
are insufficient to demonstrate the manifest injustice
required by Crim. R. 32.1 in order to vacate a plea.
State v. Hartzell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17499,
1999 WL 957746 (Aug. 20, 1999). Additionally, any claims that
were raised and rejected in a prior proceeding are barred by
res judicata. The claims made by Kendrick regarding the
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel were considered and
rejected by us in Kendrick I. Those claims are,
therefore, barred by res judicata. Any additional
out-of-court representations that [Kendrick] claims his trial
counsel made could have been the subject of a post-conviction
motion for relief. Kendrick did not seek that relief.
Accordingly he cannot ...