Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga
Civil
Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case
No. CV-08-665993
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Paul A. Mancino, Jr. Mancino, Mancino
& Mancino
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Michael C. O'Malley Cuyahoga
County Prosecutor Brian R. Gutkoski Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney The Justice Center,
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., McCormack, P.J., and S.
Gallagher, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
EILEEN
T. GALLAGHER, J.
{¶1}
Defendant-appellant, Iran Doss ("Doss"), appeals
from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas, in which that court, following a bench trial, entered
judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, state of Ohio (the
"state"), on Doss's claim for statutory
wrongful imprisonment. Doss raises the following assignments
of error for our review:
1. Plaintiff was denied due process of law as the judgment of
the court is contrary to law and the court's prior ruling
in the same case.
2. Plaintiff was denied due process of law as the ruling by
the court is not only against the manifest weight of the
evidence but is also contrary to law.
{¶2}
After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we
affirm the trial court's judgment.
I.
Procedural History
{¶3}
In April 2005, Doss was named in a three-count indictment,
charging him with two counts of rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02 and a single count of kidnapping in violation of R.C.
2905.01, with a sexual motivation specification.
{¶4}
Following a jury trial, Doss was convicted of rape, as
charged in Count 2 of the indictment, and the single count of
kidnapping. At sentencing, the trial court imposed concurrent
four-year sentences on each count. Doss was also found to be
a sexually oriented offender subject to registration.
{¶5}
On appeal, Doss challenged his rape and kidnapping
convictions on several grounds, including a challenge to the
evidence supporting his convictions. Doss argued that the
state failed to present sufficient evidence that the victim,
J.P., was substantially impaired due to a mental or physical
condition and that Doss knew of that substantial impairment.
This court, in a two-to-one decision, concluded that there
was sufficient evidence to support a finding that J.P.'s
capacity to consent was substantially impaired and that Doss
knew or had reason to know of the substantial impairment.
State v. Doss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88443,
2007-Ohio-6483 ("Doss I ").
{¶6}
Upon reconsideration, a split panel vacated both the
kidnapping and the rape convictions. State v. Doss,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449 ("Doss
II "). The Doss II majority held
that the state failed to present sufficient evidence showing
that Doss knew or had reason to know that J.P.'s ability
to consent was substantially impaired. Id. at ¶
21-23. This court vacated the convictions and ordered Doss
discharged from prison. The state appealed the vacation of
the rape conviction, but the Ohio Supreme Court declined
review. State v. Doss, 118 Ohio St.3d 1507,
2008-Ohio-3369, 889 N.E.2d 1025.
{¶7}
After his release, Doss filed an action for declaratory
judgment pursuant to R.C. 2743.48, seeking compensation from
the state for wrongful imprisonment. In July 2010, Doss filed
a motion for summary judgment, citing our decision in
Doss II The motion, which contained no attachments
or exhibits, relied exclusively on Doss II. The
state opposed the motion for summary judgment, offering the
transcripts from the criminal trial to show that there were
issues of fact and arguing that Doss had failed to establish
his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.
{¶8}
In January 2011, the trial court granted Doss's motion
for summary judgment, stating, in pertinent part:
The court of appeals' decision to reverse and vacate
plaintiff Doss's conviction and order his immediate
release can only be interpreted to mean that either plaintiff
Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted,
or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.
{¶9}
This court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in a
two-to-one decision. Doss v. State, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429 ("Doss
III"). The majority reiterated that its review of
the record in Doss II had revealed that Doss's
statement was the only evidence of J.P.'s mental
condition and that the state had presented no evidence that
Doss knew, or should have known, that J.P.'s ability to
resist or consent was substantially impaired because of
voluntary intoxication. Id. at ¶ 15.
Accordingly, this court found no genuine issue of fact and no
error in the trial court's entry of summary judgment.
Id. . at ¶ 17.
{¶10}
The dissenting judge stated:
Our holding in [Doss II] does not mean that Doss is
innocent-merely that, based upon the evidence the state
presented, Doss's guilt could not be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The same cannot automatically be said of
whether Doss can show by a preponderance of the evidence that
he did not know or reasonably should not have known of the
victim's incapacity.
Id. at ¶ 21 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
{¶11}
In Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211,
2012-Ohio-5678, 985 N.E.2d 1229 ("Doss
IV"), the Ohio Supreme Court reversed this
court's judgment in Doss III, stating, in
pertinent part:
The
record shows that Doss filed his motion for summary judgment
relying solely on the Eighth District's decision in
Doss II And the trial court granted summary judgment
on that basis alone. Specifically, the trial court stated:
The court of appeals' decision to reverse and vacate
plaintiff Doss's conviction and order his immediate
release can only be interpreted to mean that either
plaintiff Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was
convicted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss,
or both.
(Emphasis sic.)
This
conclusion was incorrect. The trial court relied solely on
the court of appeals' reversal and vacation of the
conviction to hold that Doss was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. It did not require a hearing or additional
evidence. It simply cited the court of appeals' holding
that the state had not offered sufficient evidence to prove
Doss's convictions. And in affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment, the Eighth District
correctly acknowledged Walden's [47 Ohio St.3d
547, N.E.2d 962 (1989)] rule that an acquittal does not
necessarily establish actual innocence, but then applied the
rule incorrectly. Despite the jury's verdict of guilt and
without any evidence from Doss, the majority held that the
record showed insufficient evidence of the alleged
victim's substantial impairment. Thus, the judgment of
the trial court that found Doss to be eligible for
compensation and the appellate court's judgment affirming
that finding were not based upon an affirmative showing of
actual innocence. They were based on a dearth of evidence of
guilt. Both courts relieved Doss of his statutory obligation
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not
commit the charged offense, including all lesser included
offenses, an obligation that must be fulfilled before he is
allowed to claim the status of one who was "wrongfully
imprisoned."
To show actual innocence under the wrongful-imprisonment
statute, Doss must prove that "the charged offense,
including all lesser-included offenses, either was not
committed by [him] or was not committed by any person."
R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). This court has emphasized that this
standard is not satisfied by an acquittal or a finding of
legal insufficiency of the evidence. Walden, 47 Ohio
St.3d at 52, 547 N.E.2d 962. The General Assembly requires a
showing of innocence to be made affirmatively and adjudicated
de novo before a claimant can be found to be eligible for
compensation in a wrongful-imprisonment action.
* * *
Not every person who is released from prison because of a
successful appeal is entitled to compensation. The
legislature set forth a procedure for claimants like Doss to
follow in R.C. 2743.48, so that the common pleas court could
actively separate demonstrably innocent persons who have been
wrongfully imprisoned from persons who have merely avoided
criminal liability. We hold that one who claims to be a
"wrongfully imprisoned individual" under R.C.
2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a
preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation
from the state for wrongful imprisonment. We also hold that a
trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to R.C.
2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been
wrongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellate court
judgment vacating a felony conviction due to ...