FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF
LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 15CR091491
NICHOLAS HANEK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATASHA RUIZ GUERRIERI,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Appellant, Edward Klingel, appeals the judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
This matter arises out of a series of threats that Klingel
made toward police on his Facebook page. The Lorain County
Grand Jury indicted Klingel on one count of inciting to
violence, one count of retaliation, one count of
telecommunications harassment, and one count of obstructing
official business. The grand jury subsequently returned a
supplemental indictment charging Klingel with one count of
making terroristic threats. Klingel pleaded not guilty to all
of the charges.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Prior to opening
statements, the State dismissed the inciting to violence
charge. Thereafter the jury found Klingel guilty of
telecommunications harassment and making terroristic threats.
Klingel was found not guilty of retaliation and obstructing
official business. The trial court imposed a prison term of
This Court dismissed Klingel's first attempt at an appeal
due to the fact that the sentencing entry failed to resolve
all of the charges in the indictment. The trial court issued
a revised sentencing entry resolving all of the counts in the
indictment and Klingel filed a timely notice of appeal.
Now before this Court, Klingel raises three assignments of
OF ERROR I
VERDICTS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS HARRASSMENT AND MAKING
TERRORISTIC THREAT[S], AS DEFINED BY THE COURT, IN COUNTS
THREE AND FIVE WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND
WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
In his first assignment of error, Klingel argues that his
convictions for telecommunications harassment and terroristic
threats were not supported by sufficient evidence and were
against the weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees.
Klingel was convicted of terroristic threats in violation of
R.C. 2909.23(A), which states:
No person shall threaten to commit or threaten to cause to be
committed a specified offense when both of the following
(1) The person makes the threat with purpose to do any of the
(a) Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(b) Influence the policy of any government by intimidation or
(c) Affect the conduct of any government by the threat of by
the specified offense.
(2) As a result of the threat, the person causes a reasonable
expectation or fear of the imminent commission of the
person acts purposely when it is the person's specific
intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the
offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature,
regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish
thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to
engage in conduct of that nature." R.C. 2901.22(A). The
term "threat" is not defined in the statute.
Generally speaking, however, the term "threat" in
the criminal context connotes "[a] communicated intent
to inflict harm or loss on another * * *[.]"
Black's Law Dictionary 1519 (8th Ed.2004). The
term "terroristic threat" is understood to mean
"[a] threat to commit any crime of violence with the
purpose of * * * terrorizing another[.]" Id.
When interpreting a different criminal statute, the Supreme
Court defined "threat" as "'an expression
of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another
usu[ally] as retribution or punishment for something done or
left undone.' * * * It connotes almost any expression of
intent to do an act of harm against another person