to S.C. Reporter 6/23/17
Simmons Tapocsi Assistant Attorney General.
Chang Magistrate judge.
PATRICK M. MCGRATH Judge Judge.
On January 24, 2017, defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment. On the same day, plaintiff filed a motion for
partial summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a memorandum contra
defendant's motion for summary judgment on February 8,
2017, and on February 10, 2017, defendant filed a memorandum
contra plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. The
motions are now before the court for a non-oral hearing
pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4.
Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:
"Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written
admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written
stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except
as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be
rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation,
and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the
evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the
party's favor." See also Gilbert v. Summit
Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, citing
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317
At all relevant times, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody
and control of defendant. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint
that he was falsely imprisoned for 661 days after the
conclusion of his sentence pursuant to his July 29, 2008
sentencing orders from three separate charges as described
1) 07-498250-A: "THE COURT IMPOSES A PRISON SENTENCE AT
THE LORAIN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION OF 4 YEAR(S). 1 YEAR AS
TO FIREARM SPECIFICATION TO RUN PRIOR TO AND CONSECUTIVE TO 3
YEARS ON BASE CHARGE OF COUNT 1 FOR A TOTAL OF 4 YEARS.
SENTENCE TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH CASE CR 507594 AND CR
2) 08-510974-A: "THE COURT IMPOSES A PRISON SENTENCE AT
THE LORAIN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION OF 5 YEAR(S). 3 YEARS AS
TO FIREARM SPECIFICATION TO BE SERVED PRIOR TO AND
CONSECUTIVE TO 2 YEARS ON BASE CHARGE OF COUNT 1 FOR A TOTAL
OF 5 YEARS. SENTENCE TO RUN CONCURRENT TO CASES CR 49250 AND
3) 08-507594-A: "THE COURT IMPOSES A PRISON SENTENCE AT
THE LORAIN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION OF 18 MONTH(S). TO RUN
CONCURRENT TO CASES CR 510974 AND CR 498250."
On March 27, 2013, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. The
court granted summary judgment against plaintiff based upon
R.C. 2929.14, which requires firearm specifications to be
served consecutively to base sentences. The court found that
as a matter of law, plaintiffs sentence was seven years. On
appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals remanded the case
based upon the ambiguity of the sentencing entries. On
September 17, 2014, the common pleas court concluded that it
was bound by the Third District's decision and determined
that plaintiffs sentence was a total of five years, inclusive
of the firearm specifications, in contravention of R.C.
2929.14. Plaintiff was released on that day.
Defendant first argues in its motion for summary judgment
that plaintiffs complaint was filed outside of the applicable
statute of limitations. Defendant argues that the statute of
limitations began when plaintiff discovered that he was
wrongfully imprisoned, which was the date he filed his writ
of habeas corpus. Plaintiff states that his complaint was
timely filed because false imprisonment claims accrue each
day one is falsely imprisoned, and that his claim was
preserved by the savings statute set forth in R.C. 2305.19.
R.C. 2743.16(A) provides, in relevant part, that "civil
actions against the state * * * shall be commenced no later
than two years after the date of the accrual of the cause of
action or within any shorter period that is applicable to
similar suits between private parties." Furthermore,
R.C. 2305.11(A) states that "[a]n action for libel,
slander, malicious prosecution, or false ...