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Young v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

Court of Claims of Ohio

March 22, 2017

CHRISTOPHER YOUNG Plaintiff
v.
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION Defendant

          Sent to S.C. Reporter 6/23/17

          Emily Simmons Tapocsi Assistant Attorney General.

          Sophia Chang Magistrate judge.

          DECISION

          PATRICK M. MCGRATH Judge Judge.

         {¶1} On January 24, 2017, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On the same day, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a memorandum contra defendant's motion for summary judgment on February 8, 2017, and on February 10, 2017, defendant filed a memorandum contra plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. The motions are now before the court for a non-oral hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4.

         {¶2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:

         {¶3} "Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor." See also Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977).

         {¶4} At all relevant times, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of defendant. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he was falsely imprisoned for 661 days after the conclusion of his sentence pursuant to his July 29, 2008 sentencing orders from three separate charges as described below:

1) 07-498250-A: "THE COURT IMPOSES A PRISON SENTENCE AT THE LORAIN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION OF 4 YEAR(S). 1 YEAR AS TO FIREARM SPECIFICATION TO RUN PRIOR TO AND CONSECUTIVE TO 3 YEARS ON BASE CHARGE OF COUNT 1 FOR A TOTAL OF 4 YEARS. SENTENCE TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH CASE CR 507594 AND CR 510974."
2) 08-510974-A: "THE COURT IMPOSES A PRISON SENTENCE AT THE LORAIN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION OF 5 YEAR(S). 3 YEARS AS TO FIREARM SPECIFICATION TO BE SERVED PRIOR TO AND CONSECUTIVE TO 2 YEARS ON BASE CHARGE OF COUNT 1 FOR A TOTAL OF 5 YEARS. SENTENCE TO RUN CONCURRENT TO CASES CR 49250 AND CR 507594."
3) 08-507594-A: "THE COURT IMPOSES A PRISON SENTENCE AT THE LORAIN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION OF 18 MONTH(S). TO RUN CONCURRENT TO CASES CR 510974 AND CR 498250."

         {¶5} On March 27, 2013, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. The court granted summary judgment against plaintiff based upon R.C. 2929.14, which requires firearm specifications to be served consecutively to base sentences. The court found that as a matter of law, plaintiffs sentence was seven years. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals remanded the case based upon the ambiguity of the sentencing entries. On September 17, 2014, the common pleas court concluded that it was bound by the Third District's decision and determined that plaintiffs sentence was a total of five years, inclusive of the firearm specifications, in contravention of R.C. 2929.14. Plaintiff was released on that day.

         {¶6} Defendant first argues in its motion for summary judgment that plaintiffs complaint was filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Defendant argues that the statute of limitations began when plaintiff discovered that he was wrongfully imprisoned, which was the date he filed his writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff states that his complaint was timely filed because false imprisonment claims accrue each day one is falsely imprisoned, and that his claim was preserved by the savings statute set forth in R.C. 2305.19.

         {¶7} R.C. 2743.16(A) provides, in relevant part, that "civil actions against the state * * * shall be commenced no later than two years after the date of the accrual of the cause of action or within any shorter period that is applicable to similar suits between private parties." Furthermore, R.C. 2305.11(A) states that "[a]n action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, or false ...


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