Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, Monroe
ROBERT C. WILSON PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
BECK ENERGY CORP., et al. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Motion for Reconsideration under App.R. 26(A)(1).
Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Ethan Vessels Fields, Dehmlow &
Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Scott M. Zurakowski Atty. Joseph
J. Pasquarella Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty
Cheryl L. Waite Hon. Gene Donofrio Hon. Carol Ann Robb
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Appellant Beck Energy Corp., ("Beck") requests
reconsideration of our Opinion in Wilson v. Beck Energy
Corp., 7th Dist. No. 15 MO 0010, 2016-Ohio-8564,
pursuant to App.R. 26(A). Beck asserts that a mutual consent
clause in the parties' oil and gas lease allowed them to
extend the primary term of the lease at issue. Beck argues
that Appellee Robert C. Wilson ("Wilson") continued
to accept delay rental payments after the end of the primary
term activating the mutual consent clause and extending the
primary term for at least another year. The record does not
support Beck's contention. As Appellant's motion is
based on mere disagreement with our Opinion, and this does
not provide appropriate grounds to support a motion for
reconsideration, the motion is denied.
On August 2, 2008, Beck and Wilson entered into an oil and
gas lease. The lease included a two-tiered habendum clause
with a primary term and secondary term. A primary term
provides a definite term-of-year period within which the
lease is effective. A secondary term allows for drilling to
continue past the primary term if certain requirements are
met. Here, the parties originally agreed to a ten-year
primary term but later modified this term to three years in a
separate agreement ("2008 Agreement"). The 2008
Agreement also stated that the primary term could be extended
by the mutual consent of both the Lessor and Lessee. However,
the agreement did not provide for a definite term in the
event that the mutual consent provision was activated.
The lease included a delay rental clause which allowed Beck
to delay drilling within the primary term if yearly delay
payments in the total amount of $41 were paid quarterly to
Wilson. If Beck paid the delay rental payments, the primary
term of the lease could continue without drilling. If not,
the lease would automatically terminate and revert back to
Wilson. Beck tendered delay rental payments to Wilson on a
quarterly basis from August of 2008 until February of 2014.
This period covered the three-year primary term and
approximately two additional years after the end of the
primary term. Wilson concedes that he received and cashed
these payments. On March 13, 2014, Wilson filed a declaratory
judgment action against Beck, Exxon, and XTO Energy, Inc.
("XTO"). Exxon and XTO were not part of the appeal.
All parties filed respective motions for summary judgment. On
April 9, 2015, the trial court granted Wilson's motion
for summary judgment and denied the remaining motions.
On appeal, Beck argued that once it sent delay rental
payments and Wilson cashed those checks, the mutual consent
clause was triggered and the primary term reverted back to
the original ten-year term. Although we agreed that
Wilson's actions in cashing the checks after the primary
term ended served to extend the lease, the parties had not
specified a definite term in the event that the lease was as
extended. Wilson at ¶ 21. As such, we held that
the primary term had ended, and the lease terminated, once
Wilson filed his declaratory judgement action. Id.
at ¶ 22.
"The test generally applied upon the filing of a motion
for reconsideration in the court of appeals is whether the
motion calls to the attention of the court an obvious error
in its decision, or raises an issue for consideration that
was either not considered at all or was not fully considered
by the court when it should have been." Columbus v.
Hodge, 37 Ohio App.3d 68, 523 N.E.2d 515 (10th
Dist.1987), paragraph one of the syllabus.
Here, Beck presents no obvious error in this Court's
decision. "Reconsideration motions are rarely considered
when the movant simply disagrees with the logic used and
conclusions reached by an appellate court." State v.
Himes, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 146, 2010-Ohio-332, ¶ 4,
citing Victory White Metal Co. v. Motel Syst, 7th
Dist. No. 04 MA 245, 2005-Ohio-3828; Hampton v.
Ahmed, 7th Dist. No. 02 BE 66, 2005-Ohio-1766.
Beck argues that the delay rental clause allowed it to delay
drilling on a year-to-year basis. Beck takes issue with this
Court's reference to a month-to-month lease. However,
this Court's reference was merely an acknowledgment that,
without a clearly defined term, Wilson could terminate the
lease at any time. This is akin to a month-to-month
lease. Regardless, Beck conceded that the last delay rental
check that Wilson cashed covered November of 2013 to February
of 2014. (Appellant's Brf., p. 3.) As such, Beck has not
reserved the right to delay drilling for an entire year. This
record reflects that Beck only reserved the right to delay
drilling during the time period for which it made delay
rental payments, which ended in February of 2014. It is
apparent that Beck merely disagrees with the logic and
conclusions reached by this Court.
In order to prevail on a motion for reconsideration, an
appellant must demonstrate an obvious error in our decision
or that an issue was raised that was either not dealt with or
was not fully considered. Disagreement with this Court's
logic and conclusions does not support a motion ...