United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS (DOC. 8)
Timothy S. Black, United States District Judge
case is before the Court regarding Defendant Lawlogix's
motion to dismiss (Doc. 8). For the reasons set forth below,
the motion will be granted in part.
John O'Toole, was employed by Defendant Lawlogix from on
or about May 13, 2013 to July 31, 2014 as a sales executive.
(Doc. 1, at 2-4). Plaintiff's employment was secured
through an “Employment and Proprietary Information and
Invention Agreement” signed by both parties. (Doc.
8-1). That agreement called for Plaintiff to receive a
“base salary” of $100, 000.00 per year.
(Id. at 1). The agreement also contained the
following paragraph in section 3, which outlined
“compensation and benefits”:
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
b. Commission: In addition to the salary enumerated
in paragraph 3(a), Employee shall be paid a Commission as
reasonably agreed upon by the parties and executed in writing
through a commission addendum to this employment.
(Id. at 2).
and Defendant never executed a commission addendum during
Plaintiff's tenue as an employee, and Plaintiff was never
paid any commissions for the sales he secured on
Defendant's behalf. (Doc. 1, at 4). On July 31, 2014,
Plaintiff was terminated. Defendant did not give Plaintiff a
reason for his termination.
filed the current civil action against Defendant on April 25,
2016, bringing claims of age discrimination, breach of
contract, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, and unjust
enrichment. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has completed the required
administrative process with the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission and a notice of right to sue was mailed on or
after January 26, 2016. Defendant's motion to dismiss
seeks dismissal of all claims, except Plaintiff's claim
for age discrimination. (Doc. 8).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) operates
to test the sufficiency of the complaint and permits
dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” To show grounds for
relief, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires that the complaint contain
a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 “does not require ‘detailed
factual allegations, ' . . . it demands more than an
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007)). Pleadings offering mere
“‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.'” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, in determining a
motion to dismiss, “courts ‘are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation[.]'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986)).
Further, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”
“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim is
plausible where “plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. Plausibility “is not akin to a
‘probability requirement, ' but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the ...