United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER [RESOLVING ECF NO.
Y. Pearson United States District Judge.
is a motion for relief from judgment filed by pro se
Petitioner Patrick Minefee. ECF No. 21. Respondent Grafton
Correctional Institution Warden has filed a response. ECF No.
22. The Court has been advised, having reviewed the record,
the parties' briefs and the applicable law. For the
reasons that follow, Petitioner's motion is denied.
Background & Procedural History
Petitioner Patrick Minefee filed a Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1),
alleging two grounds for relief which challenge the
constitutional sufficiency of his state conviction (Cuyahoga
County, Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-12-562160-C). On
July 30, 2015, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Greg
White for preparation of a Report and Recommendation pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). On
December 7, 2015, the magistrate judge submitted a report
(ECF No. 16) recommending that the petition be dismissed as
time barred. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72(b)(2), objections to the Report and Recommendation were
due within 14 days after service. The Court granted
Petitioner an extension of time until January 25, 2016 to
file any objection. See Order, Jan. 6, 2016.
review of the docket indicates that no objections were filed
with the Clerk of Court by January 25, 2016. On February 29,
2016, the Court issued its Memorandum of Opinion and Order,
and contemporaneously entered final judgment, adopting the
magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation and
dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time
barred. See ECF Nos. 18, 19. On March 18, 2016, Petitioner
filed an appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, Case No. 16-3260. The instant motion for
relief from judgment was subsequently filed on March 23,
2016. ECF No. 21. The Warden responded. ECF No. 22. The
matter is now ripe for adjudication.
Standard of Review for Relief from Judgment
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) provides, in relevant part,
that “[t]he court may correct a clerical mistake or a
mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is
found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The
court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without
notice.” The basic purpose of the rule is to authorize
the court to correct errors that are mechanical in nature and
that arise from oversight or omission. In re Walter, 282 F.3d
434, 440-41 (6th Cir. 2002). The rule does not, however,
authorize the court to revisit its legal analysis or
otherwise correct a substantive error in the judgment.
60(b) permits a district court to grant a motion for relief
from the judgment for any of the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously
called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
a prerequisite to relief under Rule 60(b), a party must
establish that the facts of its case are within one of the
enumerated reasons contained in Rule 60(b) that warrant
relief from judgment.” Lewis v. Alexander, 987
F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993).
60(b) does not permit parties to relitigate the merits of
claims, or to raise new claims that could have been raised
during the litigation of the case or in the initial
complaint. Rather, the purpose of a Rule 60(b) motion is to
allow a district court to reconsider its judgment when that
judgment rests on a defective foundation. The factual
predicate of a Rule 60(b) motion, therefore, deals with some
irregularity or procedural defect in the procurement of the
judgment denying relief. See In re Abdur'Rahman, 392 F.3d
174, 179-80 (6th Cir. 2004) (overruled on other grounds). It
does not afford a defeated litigant a second chance to
convince the court to rule in his favor by presenting new
explanations, new legal theories, or proof. Jinks v.
AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2001).
Standard of Review for a Magistrate Judge's Report and
objections have been made to a magistrate judge's report
and recommendation, the district court's standard of
review is ...