APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court M.C. No. 2012 TR D 202804.
Richard C. Pfeiffer, Jr., City Attorney, Lara N. Baker, City Prosecutor, and Orly Ahroni, for appellee.
Kevin B. Gunnell, pro se.
(¶ 1} This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Kevin B. Gunnell, from a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court sentencing appellant following his plea of no contest to one count of failing to register a motor vehicle.
(¶ 2} On November 30, 2012, appellant was cited for failure to register a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 4503.11. On December 7, 2012, appellant entered a not guilty plea. On December 10, 2012, appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On January 2, 2013, appellant entered a plea of no contest to the charge. The trial court filed a sentencing entry on that date, finding appellant guilty and ordering him to pay a fine of $25 and court costs.
(¶ 3} On appeal, appellant sets forth the following two assignments of error for this court's review:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION PERSONAL JURISDICTION; ALTRA VIRES ITS AUTHORITY TO USE A CONSTITUTIONAL STATE STATUTE TO FORCE UPON A CITIZEN FOR EXERCISING HIS RIGHT TO TRAVEL BY AUTO VEHICLE UPON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, ROADS AND STREETS, PROTECTED BY THE PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY CLAUSE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURIDICTION AND PERSONAL JURIDICTION, ULTRA VIRES ITS AUTHORITY FOR SUBROGATING THE NATURAL PERSON FOR THE ARTIFICIAL PERSON WHEN THE NATURAL PERSON NEVER GAVE CONSENT, PROTESTED AND HAD ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS UNDER THE UCC AS AN REBULTTAL, A COUNTERCLAIM IN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.
(¶ 4} We will address appellant's assignments of error in inverse order. Under his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction with respect to his conviction.
(¶ 5} In his pro se brief, appellant maintains that he never gave the trial court "consent to proceed" with a trial against him. As argued in his motions filed before the trial court, appellant cites to a Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") filing (a UCC-1 financing statement) in which the name of the debtor is listed as "KEVIN BRIAN GUNNELL" and the name of the secured party is listed as "Kevin Brian Gunnell." Appellant refers to the all capital letters "KEVIN BRIAN GUNNELL" as an "[a]rtificial [p]erson, " separate and distinct from "Kevin B. Gunnell, secure party creditor, natural man, sovereign." In his motion to dismiss, appellant argued that "Kevin B. Gunnell, secure party creditor, took control of the ALL-CAPS strawman name, KEVIN B. GUNNELL, by recording a ...