APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 01CR058311
CARL TAYLOR, pro se, Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
(¶1} Carl Taylor appeals an order of the Lorain County common pleas court that denied his motion to vacate illegal sentence. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
(¶2} In 2001, a jury found Mr. Taylor guilty of purposeful murder and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life imprisonment. This Court upheld his conviction on appeal. State v. Taylor, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 01CA007945, 2002-Ohio-6992.
(¶3} In August 2012, Mr. Taylor filed a "Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence, " in which he argued that his sentence is void because the trial court's sentencing entry did not comply with Criminal Rule 32(C). Specifically, he argued that the entry did not include the Revised Code section numbers for the offenses and did not reflect the sentence that was pronounced in open court. He asserted that, because the sentencing entry is deficient, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. After the trial court denied his motion, Mr. Taylor timely appealed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION HAS FOUR (4) ELEMENTS IT MUST MEET BEFORE IT BECOMES A FINAL ORDER SUBJECT TO APPEAL. A FAILURE TO RESOLVE [SIC] THERE IS NO FINAL ORDER TO WHICH AN OFFENDER MAY APPEAL.
(¶4} Mr. Taylor argues that the trial court's sentencing entry does not comply with Criminal Rule 32(C) because it "fails to state the statute." He argues that, instead of specifying whether his conviction was under Revised Code Section 2903.02(A) or 2903.02(B), the entry only provides that he was convicted of murder. He also argues that the entry does not include the same sentence that was pronounced in open court. He further argues that there was no evidence of a predicate offense to support a conviction for felony murder under Section 2903.02(B). The State asserts that his arguments are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because he could have raised them on direct appeal.
(¶5} The doctrine of res judicata "bars the assertion of claims against a valid, final judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have been raised on appeal." State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59 Although Mr Taylor acknowledges that he filed a direct appeal, he contends that this Court's decision was a nullity because the trial court's sentencing entry did not comply with Criminal Rule 32(C) See State v Rye, 9th Dist Summit No 26576, 2013-Ohio-1774, ¶ 8 This Court has explained that, until a trial court issues a judgment entry that complies with Rule 32(C), it does not "relinquish its jurisdiction" State v Turner, 9th Dist Summit No 25545, 2011-Ohio-3794, ¶ 6; State v Monteleone, 9th Dist Lorain No 10CA009751, 2010-Ohio-5064, ¶ 12 ("A reviewing court requires that a judgment of conviction comply with CrimR 32(C) for purposes of finality These are judicial mandates necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the reviewing court * * *") (Carr, J, concurring).
(¶6} Mr. Taylor's argument requires this Court to examine whether the trial court's sentencing entry complied with Criminal Rule 32(C) in order to determine whether his argument that the sentencing entry did not comply with Rule 32(C) is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Under Criminal Rule 32(C), "[a] judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict, or findings, upon which each conviction is based, and the sentence. * * * The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the clerk." In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that, under the rule, "[a] judgment of conviction is a final order * * * when it sets forth (1) the fact of ...