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Midland Funding, LLC v. andrea Brent

May 17, 2011

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, PLAINTIFF,
v.
ANDREA BRENT,
DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Katz, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On March 11, 2011, after months of settlement negotiations, this Court conditionally certified this case as a nationwide class action (Doc. 111) as part of a settlement agreement between the parties to this nearly three-year old case. In conjunction with this conditional certification, the Court issued an order (Doc. 110) enjoining parallel litigation.*fn1

Now before the Court are eight motions, filed by five different sets of parties, each relating to those orders preliminarily approving the classwide settlement of this action. The Court held oral argument on several of these motions via video conference on April 6, 2011.

Ann Rubio and Gilbert James are Virginia residents who do not wish to participate in this case and claim to have "objectively satisfied" the procedure the Court has put in place to opt out of the settlement class. They have made a special appearance to challenge the Court's personal jurisdiction over them, and have filed a motion for relief from the preliminary injunction (Doc. 115). Andrea Brent ("Brent"), Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, has filed a response to that motion (Doc. 123), as has Plaintiff/Counter Defendant Midland Funding, LLC and Counter-Defendant Midland Credit Management (collectively, "Midland") (Doc. 122).

Ladon Herring, a resident of Newport News, Virginia, has filed a motion to intervene (Doc. 117), and a motion to modify, amend, or clarify the preliminary injunction against parallel litigation (Doc. 118). In response, Brent has filed a motion to stay briefing on the motion to modify, amend, or clarify the preliminary injunction (Doc. 140), to which Midland has filed a motion for joinder (Doc. 142). Midland has also filed a response (Doc. 143) to the motion to intervene.

The State of Minnesota has moved for an order clarifying that the Court's preliminary injunction against parallel litigation does not apply to actions commenced by states (Doc. 120). Brent has filed a response to this motion (Doc. 139), as has Midland (Doc. 145); Minnesota has filed a reply (Doc. 146).

Kelli Gray and Marla Herbert are two plaintiffs and putative class representatives in a consolidated case now pending before Judge Shea of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Gray/Lauber v. Encore & Midland Funding, Midland Credit, Suttell. (No. 2:09-cv-00251). They have made a special appearance to file a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. 136). Brent (Doc. 151) and Midland (Doc. 152) have filed responses to this motion.

Midland has also filed a motion for an order (Doc. 154) requiring attorneys Leonard Bennett and Matthew Erausquin, and their firm, Consumer Litigation Associates, to produce to the parties and to the Court copies of all mailings, solicitations, and other non-privileged communications they have sent to putative class members, as well as a list identifying all persons to whom those communications were sent. Bennett and Erausquin are attorneys for Rubio, James, and Herring.

Rubio and James's motion (Doc. 115) will be denied. Herring's motion to intervene (Doc. 117) will be granted. Herring's motion to modify, amend, or clarify the preliminary injunction (Doc. 118) will be granted in part and denied in part. The motion to stay briefing (Doc. 140) on that motion will be denied, and the motion for joinder in the motion to stay (Doc. 142) will be denied as moot. The State of Minnesota's motion to clarify (Doc. 120) will be granted.

Gray and Herbert's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. 136) will be denied; however, the Midland Funding v. Brent action will be remanded to state court. The preliminary injunction will nonetheless continue in force, as this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the related cases of Franklin v. Midland Funding, No.3:10-cv-00091, and Vassalle v. Midland Funding, No. 3:11-cv-00096.

Midland's motion for an order requiring disclosure by Bennett, Erausquin, and Consumer Litigation Associates (Doc. 154) will be granted in part, they will be ordered to produce to the parties and to the Court, within three (3) business days from the issuance of this order, copies of all mailings, solicitations, and other non-privileged communications they have sent to putative class members.

I. Rubio and James's Motion for Relief from the Preliminary Injunction

Rubio currently has a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) action pending against Midland in the Eastern District of Virginia. Her case was initially filed in July 2010 as a class action James has not yet filed a legal action, but he contends that the one-year FDCPA statute of limitations will run on his claims on April 7, 2011 unless he files suit. He also wishes to file suit against Midland for civil conspiracy under Virginia law and for fraud under both Virginia law and federal law.

In their motion, Rubio and James argue that the plain language of the orders issued by this Court permits them and other putative class members to opt out of the class settlement immediately and completely, before formal notice has been sent to them as set forth in this Court's Preliminary Approval Order (Doc. 111). They urge that, otherwise, the Court's orders would violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, as well as the Due Process Clause. They also assert that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over non-Ohio class members to enforce its orders, and that the proposed class settlement in this case is generally "unfair and inadequate." The Court will address each argument in turn.

"It is in the nature of complex litigation that the parties often seek complicated, comprehensive settlements to resolve as many claims as possible in one proceeding." In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 236 (3d Cir. 2002). In such complex cases, "where certification or settlement has received conditional approval, or perhaps even where settlement is pending, the challenges facing the overseeing court are such that it is likely that almost any parallel litigation in other fora presents a genuine threat to the jurisdiction of the federal court." Id. Therefore, a federal district court overseeing settlement of a nationwide class-action has ample authority under the All Writs Act and Anti-Injunction Act to enjoin parallel litigation in order to preserve its own authority to oversee settlement. See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) ("The power conferred by the [All Writs] Act extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice, and encompasses even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice.") (internal citations omitted); Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 264 F.R.D. 438, 499 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ("There is ample authority supporting the court's power to stay pending federal and state cases to effectuate class action settlement approval."). Because this Court properly has jurisdiction over this class action, it does not need a separate basis for personal jurisdiction in order to enjoin the individual lawsuits of putative non-Ohio class members during the pendency of class settlement proceedings. See White v. National Football League, 822 F.Supp. 1389, 1433-1434 (D. Minn. 1993).*fn2 Given the risk of conflicting orders resulting from parallel litigation in this matter, it is essential that the status quo be preserved until a Fairness Hearing can be held regarding class settlement.

Rubio and James correctly point out that Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and Due Process require that they be afforded an opportunity to opt out of the class. See Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, 193 F.3d 415, 425 (6th Cir. 1999). But the law also requires that the decision to opt out be an informed one. "It is essential that class members' decisions to participate or to withdraw be made on the basis of independent analysis of their own self interest, and the vehicle for accomplishing this is the class notice." Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The dissemination of class notice "is crucial to the entire scheme of Rule 23." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such notice "is designed to present the relevant facts in an unbiased format." Impervious Paint Ind. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F.Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981). Therefore, "it is essential that the district court closely monitor the notice process and take steps necessary to ensure that class members are informed of the opportunity to exclude themselves or to participate in the judgment." Georgine, 160 F.R.D. at 490. Since one of the functions of notice under Rule 23 is to apprise putative class ...


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